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Firms producing ethanol may find management of the price risk associated with production of 
this leading alternative fuel a key factor to continued success.  As with other agricultural 
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 Growth in the production of ethanol has greatly impacted the agricultural commodity markets of 
feedstocks for biofuels plants and related crops that compete for productive farmland and access 
to markets that can alternatively utilize ethanol co-products.  However, marketing and risk 
management strategies for pricing ethanol are key to the long-run sustainability of ethanol plants. 
  The 2006-2007 run up to historic highs in grain and soybean prices due (at least in part) 
to pressure for additional corn acres to meet the growing needs of the ethanol industry, has 
focused attention on the cost of inputs and the marketing of co-products.  The importance of 
managing ethanol pricing opportunities as part of an overall risk management strategy must be 
emphasized.  Ignoring the sales of ethanol for the marketing of ethanol co-products competing 
with traditional feeds would be analogous to a lamb feedlot operator looking to market wool 
without concentrating on the primary product being meat. 
  The policy incentives promoting U.S. ethanol production have spurred tremendous 
growth.  From payments to increase production to excise tax credits, the federal and some state 
governments have contributed to the profitability of ethanol production.  High returns on 
investment were noted for several ethanol plants prior to late 2006.  But as the growth of the 
ethanol industry started to consume a large portion of U.S. corn production, ethanol feedstock 
prices have increased, putting pressure on operating margins.  At the same time, the price for 
ethanol has been quite variable. 
The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) launched ethanol futures contracts on March 23, 
2005 created a method for businesses and producers to potentially manage price risk.  Analyzing 
how well this tool has been accepted and how it has performed as a risk management tool for the 
ethanol industry is important.  The efficiency of these contracts will determine to a large part the ability firms have to utilize the contracts to actively manage price risk with hedging tools in their 
business decision making. 
 
The Structure of Ethanol Industry Sales 
Ethanol is a non-differentiated commodity.  Like other commodities, a hedge option allowing 
producers to manage inherent price risk is important.  However, the ethanol production process is 
much different than other industrial processes because output cannot be priced based on production 
input costs.  To further explain, ethanol is produced by grinding corn adding yeasts, enzymes, heat 
and allowing fermentation to occur.  After fermentation, there is the need to separate the ethanol 
from the stillage and the mash.  This process takes additional heat and drying often using natural 
gas.  The process has major inputs of corn and natural gas to produce ethanol distillers grain and 
carbon dioxide.  While corn and distillers grain may have some markets in which they may serve 
as incomplete substitutes, there is a financial disconnect between the price of inputs and products 
of the ethanol process.  Eidman assumed DDGS prices increased at a rate of 92% the rate of corn 
price increases in estimating that the cost of producing ethanol increased $0.26 for each $1 per 
bushel increase in corn prices.  He noted that while DDGS prices followed corn, they were not in 
proportion.  In light of recent price increases for corn, hedging may be essential to the long-term 
viability of ethanol plants.   
  Ethanol production and marketing is relatively new to the financial and commodity 
world.  The first ethanol produced and sold as fuel grade ethanol was in the late 1970s by Archer 
Daniels Midland Company (ADM).  The number of producers has grown over the years to 134 at 
the end of 2007 with another 77 plants under construction according to the Renewable Fuels 
Association.  The marketing of ethanol is completed by 8 marketers and sold to petroleum blenders.  Because this industry started out with few producers and even fewer marketers, price 
discovery has been limited and held closely by those companies, unlike the corn market at the 
time the Chicago Board of Trade initiated corn contracts in 1848.   
  Most ethanol is contracted twice throughout the year.  There is a summer blend period 
and a winter blend period with contracting occurring 6 to 9 months prior to the delivery period.  
Therefore, use of ethanol may not occur for up to one year from the contract date.  Not all 
gallons are sold in advance of delivery, some are left to the spot market which represents about 
10% of total production.  The price risk for non-contracted ethanol production is significant.   
  Ethanol pricing information has been limited and is usually held between a few ethanol 
marketing companies and blenders in the U.S.  Further difficulty for investors and ethanol 
producers is the price realization and transactional transparency.  Due to a concern regarding the 
lack of market transparency and growth of the ethanol industry, the Chicago Board of Trade 
instituted an ethanol contract for domestically produced ethanol.   
 
CBOT Ethanol Contracts 
The CBOT ethanol contract, with a ticker symbol of AC in the open outcry and ZE in the 
electronic market, is traded in 29,000 gallon increments with each tick equal to $0.001 per gallon 
or $29 per contract.  Contract months are the 12 consecutive calendar months with the last 
trading day to be the business day prior to the 15
th of the delivery month.  The contract can only 
move fifteen cents per gallon below or above the previous day’s settlement price.  The spot 
month has no limits and starts on the first day of the month.  The ethanol contract is a deliverable 
contract to a designated delivery point at the buyer’s terminal.  It was anticipated that the 
majority of the delivery points would be in the Chicago area.  The deliverable product must meet the American Society of Testing and Materials standard D 4806 for “Denatured Fuel Ethanol for 




Fama defined efficient markets using three forms of efficiency:  weak, semi-strong and strong.  
These levels of efficiency are essentially determined by the effect information has on the 
movement of markets.  This is particularly important to the ethanol industry as the quantity, 
timing and type of information the markets have access to is limited.  Fama suggests that markets 
are inefficient in the strong form, when information is only available to those people within the 
industry or others having special knowledge.  Weak form efficiency indicates that all past 
information is included in prices; the semi-strong form adds to the weak form and includes all 
relevant public information.  The strong form efficiency includes information for the semi-strong 
along with insider or proprietary information.  Some have argued that the above definitions do 
not take into the account the cost of information, and that for the above to hold exactly, the cost 
of information would need to be zero (Grossman and Stiglitz).   
  The definition of inefficiency will help us to better understand an efficient market.  
Simply put, if a model can be developed to better predict a future spot price then the underlying 
futures market is inefficient (Rausser and Carter).  An efficient market is one where the 
movement of price is reflective of the information provided today.  
  For markets to exist, there needs to be participants exchanging contracts.  Kastens and 
Schroeder (1995) state that a commodity being traded relies on the market being unbiased or 
efficient and that traders entering or leaving the market should have the perception that they have benefited from an efficient market.  Both conditions are necessary for trades to occur. 
Participants can be made up of various groups.  They can be people involved in the production of 
the item being traded, individuals who use the items produced, marketers or resellers of the items 
or they may be speculators.  Each group may influence the market, especially since each may or 
may not have similar information.   
  Luo analyzed the roles of speculators and producers by trying to quantify a speculator’s 
role in influencing the market outcome and how close or far the futures market varies from the 
spot price of a commodity.  He determined those traders acting on better information 
accumulated more wealth than other traders.  Moreover, as a contract gets closer to expiration, 
the available information is more accurate, and convergence of the futures price to the spot price 
will occur.  He concludes that during the short run of a futures contract, participants’ trades were 
based on emotions, current events and available financial information for a commodity, making 
the price representative of a compilation of noise being traded at the time.   
  Other items that can lead to discrepancy between futures markets and spot cash markets 
could be irrational participants, imperfect capital markets, government intervention, costs of 
information, timing of information, and the risk aversion of the participants (Rausser and Carter).  
However, current events, emotion and other information are exactly what Fama discussed, 
because this new information moves the market accordingly.   
  Wang and Ke suggest that short-term markets are not as efficient as long-term ones.  As 
the futures markets price changes reflecting the available information, the spot price also 
changes.  The reaction of the cash market to the futures markets provides the base for market 
efficiency.     Time prior to futures contract expiration is a consideration in markets.  The closer a 
contract is to expiration, the more predictable the spot price should be.  Current information, 
including spot prices, impact expectations of futures contract prices for a distant contract.  
However, beyond 6 weeks from expiration, research has found a futures contract is not an 
efficient tool for determining the spot market price at the time of the expiration of the contract 
(Bigman, Goldfarb, and Schechtman; Stein; Seiler and Rom). 
  A final consideration is to examine the effect of trading volumes on market efficiency.  
There are few studies that have analyzed this aspect of the market and no studies were found that 
observed this in commodity markets.  Antoniou, Ergul, Holmes and Priestley looked at technical 
analysis, trading volume and market efficiency in an emerging market.  They concluded that 
technical analysis with respect to volume can help the prediction of past returns that otherwise 
could not be done with past performance information alone.  Volume is a more relevant price 
movement predictor in low volume stocks than in high volume stocks. 
  Determining whether a market is efficient is dependant on the data collected, time frame 
from which the data is collected, and analytical tools used to conduct the analysis.  For the 
purpose of this paper, we will consider the time variables of both spot and futures prices of the 
Chicago contracts, the price of corn, the natural gas futures traded on the NYMEX, gasoline 
futures and the cash price of gasoline paid at the blending terminals, and the volume of ethanol 
contracts traded. 
 
Building the Models to Examine Efficiency of Ethanol Contract 
We will analyze the cash price of ethanol as dependant on variables related to the actual 
production of ethanol and those affecting the demand.  Specifically, we examine the relationship of the cash price of ethanol to:  the cash corn price, the price of natural gas, price of distillers 
grain, price of unleaded gasoline, stocks of unleaded gasoline, stocks of ethanol, and the price of 
crude oil 2 months prior.  The cash ethanol prices after the launch of CBOT ethanol contracts 
should include the above factors plus the CBOT settlement price of ethanol, ethanol open interest 
and ethanol volume.  The volume and open interest of the CBOT contracts will be analyzed for 
their importance to the efficiency of the contracts.   
  Corn currently represents the largest portion of the variable cost when producing ethanol.  
If the industry would follow a cost plus pricing mechanism, then ethanol producers would price 
ethanol according to its input prices and the price of ethanol should mirror the price movements 
in corn.  However, ethanol is not priced according to its inputs; therefore, there may be little 
correlation between the price of ethanol and the price of corn. 
  Natural gas is the second major cost component in the production of ethanol.  As the 
price of natural gas increases, the price of ethanol should also increase.  Ethanol should follow 
the natural gas price, because natural gas trends with other energy sources and is a major cost 
component in the corn ethanol production process.   
  Distillers grain is an output from the process of converting corn into ethanol.  Distillers 
grain provides a positive income stream to the plants and should follow the trend of corn price 
based on the protein markets.  The correlation between the price of ethanol and the price of 
distiller grain would be positive if it is determined that the price of corn and the price of ethanol 
trend in similar directions. 
  The ethanol market is thought to be closely tied to the gasoline market and moves when 
gasoline price moves.  The ethanol cash price reflects those gallons that have not been forward 
contracted during the time period less than 6 months prior to the contracts being exercised.  Ethanol contracts that are traded more than 9 months out should be influenced by the price 
movements of the CBOT ethanol contracts.  Though it is generally assumed that the price of 
ethanol follows the price of unleaded gasoline, there have been times during certain blending 
months that the trend has not followed; typically the change from winter blends to summer 
blends.   
  Stocks of gasoline are thought to influence the price of ethanol.  As the stocks of gasoline 
or the amount held in inventory increases, the price of ethanol would be expected to decrease.  
Likewise as the stocks of gasoline decrease, the price of ethanol should increase, thus stocks of 
gasoline may have a negative correlation with respect to ethanol prices.   Stocks of ethanol 
would be expected to have a negative correlation on the price of ethanol.  As the stocks of 
ethanol increase, the price of ethanol should decrease.   
  The time for crude oil to be processed (starting with its extraction from the ground) and 
converted into gasoline takes approximately 2 months.  For our analysis we will consider the 
actual months it takes to convert crude oil to gasoline as 2 months prior to the current price time 
of ethanol.  The correlation between crude oil and ethanol should be positive.  
  The ethanol contracts did not have large amounts of open interest or high volumes 
compared to several other commodity futures markets during the time period included in this 
analysis when the CBOT ethanol contracts were first launched.  There were few trades that 
occurred during the trading day and this lack of volume may be important in determining the 
efficiency of the ethanol contracts.  The number of open interest contracts is expected to have a 
positive correlation on the efficiency between ethanol and the CBOT price of ethanol. 
  Higher CBOT ethanol prices should have a positive influence on the cash price of 
ethanol.  An exception to this would be if the cash price is on the opposite side of the closing settlement price at the end of the contract.  Because we are assuming the contracts are efficient 
and we know the closer to the delivery months the closer the contract and cash prices are to 
equilibrium, they should converge.   
  The quantity of ethanol contracts should have a positive influence on the price of ethanol 
during the initial months the contract is introduced.  John Litterio, Fuels Division Manager for 
US Bio Energy, suggested the CBOT ethanol contracts need volume in order to move the 
market.  He also assumes that the movement will be positively correlated to the pricing of 
ethanol.  That is to say, as there are more contracts being traded there should be a positive 
correlation to the movement of ethanol at this point in contract trading maturity.  However, it is 
important to note that as we get more volume and more information to other traders, this volume 
may also have a negative effect on the price of the cash ethanol.  For other commodities the 
amount of volume is not a predictor of the overall price movement.  Open interest is expected to 
have a positive impact on the price of ethanol, because it is believed more volume is needed to 
make the markets move, therefore a positive correlation.  With less open interest, many traders 
may offset their position at a discount because of the limited volume in the market.   
  When estimating equations for ethanol futures contract prices they should include cash 
ethanol prices paid at the Chicago terminals.  The cash price of ethanol paid is expected to have a 
positive correlation to the ethanol futures contract price.   
  Three equations were estimated to determine whether CBOT ethanol markets are 
efficient and if there is importance to the lack of volume and open interest that was a 
characteristic of the ethanol contract markets immediately following the contract launch. 
Regression analysis was used to estimate the coefficients, T values, adjusted R squared values 
and error terms. The first regression equation included 27 months preceding the start of the CBOT ethanol contracts.  The next equation was estimated for the cash price of ethanol after the 
start of the CBOT ethanol contracts using daily pricing.  The third equation estimated was for the 
cash price of ethanol after the start of the CBOT ethanol contract, and included the CBOT 
ethanol price, open interest, and volume. 
  The cash price of ethanol (PCE) prior to the opening of the CBOT ethanol contracts is 
explained with the following equation with variables listed in Table 1: 
(1)  PCE  =  β0 + βPUG + βPNG + βPCC + βPDDG + βQUG + βQE+ βPCO (t-2)  
   +  βQEST + βQESL + βPNYNG + εt               
where β0 is a constant, PUG is the price of unleaded gas, PNG is the price of natural gas, PCC is 
the price of cash corn, PDDG is the price of distillers grain, QUG is the quantity of unleaded 
gasoline, QE is the quantity of ethanol produced, PCO(t-2) is the price of crude oil two months 
prior, QEST is the quantity of ethanol stock, QESL is the quantity of ethanol sales, PNYNG is 
the New York Mercantile Exchange month closest to the current month for the price of natural 
gas and εt is the standard error term. 
  Data available prior to the CBOT contracts are thin and will be run on a monthly basis 
with available data points.  This model will be run a second time utilizing daily data (as 
available) following the start of the CBOT ethanol contracts to estimate a second regression 
equation to analyze the impact of a richer data set for impacts on variable coefficients. 
  The cash price following the start of the CBOT ethanol contracts using the contract data 
is modeled as:   
(2)  PCE = β0 + βPUG + βPNG + βPCC + βPDDG + βQUG + βQE + βPCO (t-2) + βQEST  
   +  βQESL + βPNYNG + βPCBE + βQCBOI + βQCBV + εt The additional variables are PCBE - the price of ethanol on the CBOT; QCBOI - the quantity of 
open interest; and QCBV - the volume of contracts traded on the CBOT ethanol floor. 
 Table 1.  Model Variable Key 
Symbol Variable 
PCE  Cash Ethanol Price 
PCC  Cash Corn Price 
PUG  Unleaded Gasoline Price 
QUG  Unleaded Gasoline Quantity 
PCO  Crude Oil Price 
PDDG  Distillers Grain Price 
PNG  Cash Natural Gas Price  
QE  Ethanol Production Quantity 
QEST Ethanol  Stocks 
QESL Ethanol  Sales 
PNYNG NYMEX  Natural  Gas 
QCBOI  CBOT Ethanol Open Interest 
QCBV CBOT  Ethanol  Contract Volume 
PCBE CBOT  Ethanol  Price 
 
Examining the Efficiency of CBOT Ethanol Contracts 
Brealey and Myers suggest that if a market is efficient, the prices tomorrow are not influenced by 
the results of today.  Determining the percentage change in price on day t and comparing that to 
the percentage change in price on t-1 allows that comparison to be made.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
relationship before the CBOT ethanol contracts traded; Figure 2 expresses the same for cash 
ethanol markets after CBOT ethanol contracts traded.  Figure 3 compares the daily CBOT 
ethanol price percentage change after the contracts started trading.  Both before and after the 
introduction of the CBOT ethanol contracts the correlation is low and not statistically significant 
indicating a fairly efficient market.  The random walk theory suggests little correlation between 
successive period price changes.  This occurs in the monthly and daily data for cash ethanol and 
the daily data for the CBOT price. Figure 1.  Cash Ethanol Monthly Price Change Before CBOT 


























Figure 2.  Cash Ethanol Daily Price Changes After CBOT 
























 Figure 3.  CBOT Ethanol Price Daily Price Changes 



























  Cash corn, unleaded gas price, natural gas cash price, distillers grain price, unleaded gas 
quantity, and ethanol production quantity explained 73.8% of the price variation in cash ethanol 
price (Table 2).  None of the variables are statistically significant at the 5% level. The correlation 
for all the independent variables moved as anticipated.   The number of observations was a total 
of 27 from November 2002 to February 2005. 
 








   
Before CBOT Ethanol Contracts (Monthly Data) 
  
Variable        Coefficient of Variation  T Value 
Unleaded Gasoline Price  0.303100  1.82 
Cash Corn   -0.086200  -0.66 
Unleaded Gasoline Quantity  0.000007  0.08 
Distillers Grain 
Price   0.004066  1.66 
Cash Natural Gas Price   0.043330  1.16 
Ethanol Production Quantity  0.001946  1.74 
* Denotes Statistically Significant                    Observations  27 
Adjusted R squared  73.8% When equation 2 was estimated, more variables were shown to be significant using daily data than 
monthly data (Table 3).  The equation explains 94.5 % of the variability of the cash ethanol price.  
The significant variables for this equation were the unleaded gas price, unleaded gas quantity, 
DDG price, natural gas price, and ethanol production quantity. 
Table 3.  Daily Data Comparison of CBOT Ethanol Variables 
        
After CBOT Ethanol 
Contracts without CBOT 
Ethanol Variables      
(Daily Data)   
After CBOT Ethanol Contracts All 
Variables                       
(Daily Data) 




Value      
Coefficient of 
Variation  T Value    
Cash Corn    -0.027700 -.033     0.015580  0.31   
Unleaded Gasoline Price  0.794930 12.72 *   0.318950  7.60  * 
Unleaded Gasoline 
Quantity -0.000163 -3.72 *   -0.000044  -1.71   
Distillers Grain 
Price   0.076104 10.40 *   0.007652  1.48   
Cash Natural Gas Price   0.049837 5.87 *   0.017231  3.48  * 
Ethanol Production 
Quantity 0.009888 17.12 *   0.002157  2.94  *   
Volume     0.001311  0.66   
CBOT Ethanol Open 
Interest     -0.000135  -3.33  * 
CBOT Ethanol 
Price       0.802200  21.72  * 
* Denotes Statistically Significant           Observations   215     
Adjusted R squared  94.5%       98.3%   
 
  Three additional independent variables are used as predictors of the cash ethanol price 
following the introduction of the CBOT ethanol contracts:  the CBOT ethanol price, CBOT 
ethanol open interest and CBOT ethanol volume.  Including these variables increased the 
adjusted R square from 94.5 to 98.3 percent (Table 3).  Five of the nine variables are significant 
with absolute T values greater than 2.  Unleaded gas price, ethanol production quantities, cash 
natural gas price, CBOT ethanol price, and ethanol open interest are those independent variables 
that are statistically significant.   Unleaded gasoline price was a significant variable in predicting the price of cash ethanol.  
According to the model, the price of cash ethanol would increase $0.0319 per gallon with an 
increase of $0.10 in the price of unleaded gas.  An increase in cash natural gas price of one dollar 
would increase the price of ethanol by $0.02 per gallon.  A price variation of the CBOT ethanol 
price by $0.10 would be expected to vary the price of ethanol by $0.08 per gallon.    
  The coefficients for corn went from a negative 0.0277 to a positive 0.01558.  Unleaded 
gasoline went from a positive coefficient of 0.79493 to a positive 0.31895.  This change in slope 
may be a result that the CBOT ethanol contract is incorporating information contained in the 
independent variables, suggesting a move towards market efficiency.  Distillers grain went from 
a positive 0.076104 to 0.007652.  The significant variables that remained after the independent 
variables of the CBOT were added are the unleaded gas price, cash natural gas price, ethanol 
production quantity, CBOT ethanol open interest and the CBOT ethanol price.  If the CBOT was 
efficient, the CBOT ethanol price would have been the only significant independent variable. 
  Analyzing the absolute ratio of cash ethanol to CBOT ethanol and comparing that to 
volume will determine the significance of volume to equalizing the cash and futures market.  The 
regression indicates that the volume was not statistically significant with a T value of 1.82.  
Additionally, the individual regression equation of volume to ethanol cash was not significant. 
 
Conclusions 
There are equations that can be developed with accuracy on the past prices of cash ethanol.  From 
the literature review, it was determined that if a regression can be developed with great precision, 
then the market being analyzed is inefficient.  One may jump to the conclusion that the ethanol 
futures market is inefficient because of the developed regression equation, but proceed with caution.  As McKenzie and Holt stated “Market efficiency implies that futures market prices will 
equal expected future spot prices plus or minus a constant or possibly, a time-varying risk premia.”  
This definition would hold true for the ethanol futures price and the cash ethanol prices as they are 
traded within a month of the expiration of the futures contract. 
  The CBOT ethanol contracts seem to add efficiency to the cash ethanol price.  The CBOT 
is a source to provide pricing information to the marketplace for producers, marketers, and 
purchasers of ethanol to consider ethanol values.  This is a step to transparency of prices.   
  Volume of the CBOT was not significant in the developed regression equation.  The 
interpretation that a futures contract needs an extreme amount of volume to move the prices 
together was rejected.  Volume did not contribute any significance to the CBOT ethanol price, cash 
ethanol price or the ratio of CBOT to cash price. 
  The change in data availability was a significant factor in helping bring more transparency 
to the market.  Prior to the CBOT ethanol contracts being traded, there were limited sources of 
daily cash ethanol prices. 
  The CBOT ethanol contract can be used as a tool for ethanol producers to spread their risk.  
Because the CBOT ethanol contract is a deliverable contract, liquidity is less of an issue to ethanol 
producers because they can deliver their position.  This tool will allow producers to hedge their 
future production 12 months ahead. 
 
Following Periods Post CBOT Ethanol Contract Launch 
The data gathered for this research was constrained by the commercially available set obtained by 
one of the co-authors.  The conclusions list the need for continuing analysis of this topic with more 
data available over a longer period of trading for the CBOT contracts.  One of the more challenging areas since then has been the lack of publicly available data.  While costly private 
industry data may be obtained (sometimes for a nominal fee or even free from some of our 
colleagues interested in the outcome of research from papers such as this), it is paramount for the 
success of an efficiency study or for an efficient market that this data be available.  Truly the 
movement of the CBOT ethanol prices has lent support for obtaining richer data to examine 
ethanol pricing.  However, the data to compare contract prices with cash prices still leaves much to 
be desired. 
  For instance, the correlation of CBOT ethanol nearby contract prices with cash prices 
obtained through a private data source earlier in this analysis from March 23, 2005 to February 3, 
2006 was 98.3%.  One might expect an increase in this correlation as the contract trade volume and 
open interest increased further beyond the date of the initial launch.  However, using USDA’s 
Agricultural Market Service Livestock and Grain Market News Branch data for cash ethanol prices 
in Iowa (there is only now data starting to be collected for Chicago and it is quite thin), and 
examining the correlation with CBOT ethanol contract prices, one can find a correlation coefficient 
of roughly 94%. 
  While the data from USDA-AMS provides publicly accessible data, it is reported in a 
weekly high-low format and is relatively thin due to a lack of reporting for this area.  Arguably, the 
lack of daily price movement and using a midpoint of the high and low prices reported takes away 
from the richness one would expect from a “for-cost” private report.  Just how reliable these 
private data sources are is also an unknown with no standard existing to benchmark against. 
 
Data Requirements and Future Research The Summary of the 2006 USDA Data Users Meeting expressed concerns over data available for 
energy and specifically co-products of the ethanol industry.  While several governmental data 
resources exist, a great deal of estimation and backwards induction is used rather than factual 
reporting in the area of ethanol and biofuels in general.  This was identified as an area of need 
and where feedback is sought from data users for the importance of this heretofore unavailable 
direct information.  Indeed it is an area where more foundational data is needed for greater 
transparency and usefulness to the energy sector, consumers, and those who seek to participate in 
the supply and utilization of commodities associated with renewable fuels. 
  While conducting this analysis with updated information using the techniques put forth 
would provide useful results in examining the CBOT contracts in light of their expanded use and 
longer existence, utilizing more readily verifiable source data should provide even more rigorous 
results. 
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